FBI

FBI

Biroul Federal de Investigații (FBI) este o agenție de informații cu finanțare federală și este principala sursă de resurse de investigație pentru SUA Motto-ul său este „Fidelitate, vitejie, integritate”. Sediul său se află la Washington, D.C.Nașterea birouluiÎn 1908, biroul s-a născut ca o forță de agenți speciali, care a fost creat de procurorul general Charles Bonaparte în timpul președinției lui Theodore Roosevelt. La început, Biroul de Investigații a recrutat în principal bărbați care aveau experiență anterioară în aplicarea legii. Infracțiunile federale nu erau o problemă majoră în țară când a fost inițiat biroul. Cele mai frecvente încălcări care au primit atenția biroului au implicat fraude bancare naționale, fraude funciare, diverse forme de înrobire și extorcare.În iunie 1910, Legea Mann („Sclavul alb”) a devenit un instrument important pentru birou. Biroul de Investigații a folosit, de asemenea, Legea Mann pentru a aduce în fața justiției Ku Klux Klan din Louisiana „Kleagle imperial”. În 1912, fostul examinator special, Bruce Bielaski, a devenit noul șef al biroului. Din 1912 până în 1914, Biroul de investigații a angajat aproximativ 300 de agenți speciali repartizați la diverse infracțiuni federale, precum și peste 300 de personal de birou care oferă sprijin și logistică pentru agenți de teren. Deși acele avanposturi au fost plasate în principal în orașe mai mari, cererea pentru o prezență lângă granița mexicană a devenit curând evidentă și a obligat plasarea avanposturilor în orașele de frontieră mai mici pentru a investiga diferite cazuri de contrabandă ilegală. în contradicție cu un public frustrat. În timpul celor numiți „anii fără lege”, mulți americani au rezistat instituirii interdicției, în timp ce alții erau implicați în politica extremistă. Raidurile de tip speakeasies (cluburi de noapte care servesc alcool) și utilizarea de speakeasies de momeală au dus la arestarea multor bootleggeri (contrabandiști de alcool) în timpul interzicerii.O astfel de nelegalitate își are rădăcinile în Crima Organizată, iar biroul a fost profund implicat în eliminarea acesteia. Capturarea unor criminali precum „Mitraliera” Kelly, tâlharul de bănci John Dillinger și „Baby Face” Nelson au devenit priorități urgente, iar biroul a câștigat respectul public în ceea ce privește rolul lor în dărâmarea acelor bătăuși.Anii HooverLa 10 mai 1924, J. Edgar Hoover, în vârstă de 26 de ani, a devenit directorul biroului. A înființat o academie specială de formare a agenților, cu o vârstă minimă de intrare între 25 și 35 de ani și, până la sfârșitul anilor douăzeci, fusese coordonarea tuturor birourilor de teren cu fișiere centralizate care conțin carduri de amprentă digitală. a deschis Laboratorul FBI pentru detectarea criminalității științifice (alias Biroul instruiește, de asemenea, laboratorul de criminalitate de stat și local și personalul de aplicare a legii din toată țara, la Academia FBI din Quantico, Virginia.Începând cu anii '40, biroul a abordat cazurile de spionaj în țintele SUA care au fost luate „în centrul orașului” de către agenții FBI. FBI a angajat multe astfel de programe de contraspionaj, începând cu anii 1950. ince Din 1949, lista celor zece cei mai căutați fugari ai FBI a fost la dispoziția agenților pentru a colabora cu alte agenții de aplicare a legii și cu publicul larg, pentru a ajuta la capturarea fugarilor periculoși. a format „COINTELPRO” (un acronim pentru serviciile de contraspionaj) pentru a „neutraliza” disidenții politici din Statele Unite între 1956 și 1971. Când COINTELPRO a fost expus în 1971, biroul și-a întrerupt operațiunile. din resursele agenției care investighează socialiști nevinovați și alți activiști politici diferiți - adunând frecvent dosare uriașe asupra persoanelor din proces. Astfel de americani notabili precum Eleanor Roosevelt, care avea cel mai gros dosar personal, și Martin Luther King Jr., au fost obiectele examinării regizorului.După HooverCrima organizată a continuat să simtă presiunea neobosită a FBI-ului. Fost șofer și ucigaș angajat pentru succesorul lui Al Capone, Frank „The Enforcer” Nitti, se credea că Giancana a fost unul dintre acei gangsteri recrutați de CIA pentru asasinarea președintelui cubanez Fidel Castro. Datorită stilului său de viață înalt și a supravegherii intense de către FBI, Giancana a fost detronat de mafie și ulterior asasinat în casa sa din Illinois, în iunie 1975, la întoarcerea din exil în Mexic. O serie de alte investigații ale FBI din anii 1970 și 1980 au atenuat oarecum puterea mafiei. Într-o confruntare de 51 de zile în afara Waco, Texas, în 1993, FBI, ATF (Biroul de alcool, tutun și arme de foc) și Texas Rangers au încercat fără succes. pentru a salva filiala Davidianii credeau că vor fi ținuți ostatici de liderul lor, David Koresh, în complexul lor numit Muntele Carmel. FBI și-a angajat echipa de salvare a ostaticilor (HRT) și agentul special responsabil (SAC) de la biroul din San Antonio pentru a efectua tactici antiteroriste pe Koresh. procurorul general Janet Reno a aprobat utilizarea gazului clorobenziliden malononitril (CS) pentru neutralizarea apărătorilor compusului. ATF și FBI au fost ulterior acuzați de forță excesivă în ceea ce a început ca o investigație asupra „afacerii cu arme” a lui Koresh și s-a încheiat cu un incendiu neîncetat și cu moartea majorității adepților din interiorul complexului. FBI s-a confruntat cu turncoats. Presupusul spion ar fi fost expus de o echipă de vânătoare de alunițe. La 24 februarie 1994, Aldrich Ames, un veteran de 31 de ani al Agenției Centrale de Informații (CIA), a fost reținut de FBI în Arlington, Virginia, sub acuzații de spionaj. Ames spionase rușii din 1985. Secolul 21 și evenimentele din 11 septembrie 2001 au adus în prim plan o altă rasă de violență îndreptată către America, iar FBI a trebuit să-și adapteze și să modifice tehnicile sale de combatere a terorismului pentru a face față acestor amenințări. . Născut din administrația George W. Bush, noul act permite agenților speciali să monitorizeze posibilele celule teroriste sau activități prin interceptări telefonice, precum și activități pe internet, printre alte dispoziții.Regizori de la HooverFBI a avut o lungă succesiune de directori de la moartea lui Hoover, în 1973, fiecare contribuind la birou. Modernizând biroul, Kelley a limitat, de asemenea, investigațiile arbitrare și a început să permită mai multor femei și minorități să se alăture gradelor de agenți speciali.Kelley a prezidat biroul până în 1978, când William H. Sessions a implementat și politici de creștere a numărului de femei și minorități din birou. În 1993, președintele Bill Clinton a respins sesiunile pe fondul acuzațiilor de conduită neetică. Mueller, III.ConcluzieDe-a lungul anilor, Biroul Federal de Investigații a fost implicat în ancheta și capturarea multora dintre cei mai perfizi criminali din istoria americană. FBI rămâne un birou federal în evoluție, cu cea mai largă autoritate și jurisdicție a oricărei agenții federale de aplicare a legii.


¹ O persoană de încredere care lucrează într-un post cu informații clasificate, care a fost angajată de o agenție de spionaj străină.
² Vezi Julius și Ethel Rosenberg.


Mai multe despre spionajul FBI

FBI are o lungă istorie în care a abuzat de puterile sale de supraveghere a securității naționale. Potențialul abuzului este încă o dată mare, în special având în vedere că limitele dintre investigațiile penale și operațiunile de informații străine au fost neclare sau șterse începând cu 11 septembrie. Ca urmare, instrumentele de supraveghere intruzive dezvoltate inițial pentru a viza spionii sovietici sunt din ce în ce mai utilizate împotriva americanilor.

COINTELPRO. În timpul Războiului Rece, FBI a organizat un program de informații / contraspionaj intern numit COINTELPRO care a evoluat rapid dintr-un efort legitim de a proteja securitatea națională de amenințările străine ostile într-un efort de suprimare a disidenței politice interne printr-o serie de activități ilegale. COINTELPRO a vizat numeroase grupuri de proteste non-violente și disidenți politici cu interceptări ilegale, căutări fizice fără mandat și o serie de alte trucuri murdare. FBI a folosit informațiile obținute din aceste investigații necorespunzătoare nu în scopul aplicării legii, ci pentru a „rupe căsătoriile, a întrerupe întâlnirile, a ostraciza persoanele din profesiile lor și a provoca grupuri țintă în rivalități care ar putea duce la decese”. Comitetul bisericesc, un comitet selectiv al Senatului care a investigat COINTELPRO în anii 1970, a constatat că o combinație de factori i-a determinat pe oamenii legii să devină infractori ai legii. Un factor a fost percepția lor că metodele tradiționale de aplicare a legii erau ineficiente în abordarea amenințărilor la adresa securității cu care se confruntau. Un altul a fost accesul lor ușor la informațiile personale dăunătoare ca urmare a „colectării neîngrădite a informațiilor interne”. Din păcate, acești factori sunt din nou prezenți astăzi, deoarece FBI încearcă să se transforme într-o agenție de informații internă dedicată prevenirii actelor teroriste viitoare.

Reformele anulate. Expunerea Comitetului Bisericii asupra abuzurilor COINTELPRO ale FBI a dus la o serie de reforme, inclusiv legi menite să reglementeze supravegherea guvernului și orientările interne (Orientările Procurorului General), care au limitat autoritatea de anchetă a FBI și au precizat regulile care guvernează operațiunile de aplicare a legii. Aceste limite rezonabile au fost fie abandonate, fie ignorate începând cu 11 septembrie, totuși, prin legislație precum Actul SUA privind Patriotul, prin amendamente la Orientările AG și printr-o extindere a puternicelor forțe comune de combatere a terorismului (JTTF) care funcționează practic fără public responsabilitate.

Act patriotic. Odată cu adoptarea actului SUA Patriot Act, Congresul a extins autoritatea FBI pentru a face cereri secrete de informații personale și înregistrări nu doar despre presupuși teroriști sau spioni, ci despre oricine pe care FBI l-a considerat doar „relevant” pentru o investigație FBI. Nu este surprinzător faptul că o serie de cinci audituri efectuate de inspectorul general al Departamentului Justiției au confirmat gestionarea pe scară largă a FBI, utilizarea abuzivă și abuzul acestei autorități necontrolate, care este acum folosită, cel mai adesea, pentru a viza americani. Pentru mai multe informații despre Patriot Act, consultați pagina extinsă a ACLU despre această problemă.

Liniile directoare ale procurorului general. Orientările AG au suferit patru modificări separate sub administrația Bush, toate acestea oferind FBI autorităților de supraveghere sporite cu supravegherea redusă. Procurorul general John Ashcroft a modificat pentru prima dată liniile directoare în 2002 pentru a extinde tehnicile de investigație pe care FBI le-ar putea folosi în timpul anchetelor preliminare (care necesită mai puține dovezi ale faptelor greșite pentru a iniția decât o anchetă completă) și pentru a mări termenele la 180 de zile cu posibilitatea două sau mai multe extensii de 90 de zile. Liniile directoare Ashcroft au permis, de asemenea, agenților FBI să „viziteze orice loc și să participe la orice eveniment deschis publicului, în aceleași termeni și condiții ca și membrii publicului în general”. Ulterior, FBI a susținut că această autoritate nu a cerut agenților FBI care participă la ședințele publice să se identifice drept oficiali guvernamentali.

Încercând să-și calmeze îngrijorarea că FBI ar folosi abuziv această autoritate extinsă, vizând activitatea protejată în primul amendament, directorul FBI, Robert Mueller, a declarat Congresului în 2002 că FBI nu avea planuri de a se infiltra în moschei. Cu toate acestea, în anii următori a existat o creștere bruscă a utilizării controversate a FBI de informatori ca agenți provocatori în medii religioase, inclusiv în Miami, New York și nordul și sudul Californiei. În 2009, directorul Mueller a apărat aceste tactici, spunând că FBI nu „își va lua [piciorul] de pe pedala de abordare a terorismului”.

În 2005, inspectorul general al Departamentului Justiției (IG) a verificat conformitatea FBI cu liniile directoare AG și a constatat deficiențe semnificative: 53% din anchetele preliminare auditate care s-au extins dincolo de perioada inițială de autorizare de 180 de zile nu conțineau documentația necesară pentru autorizarea prelungirii și 77% dintre cei care s-au extins după prima perioadă de prelungire de 90 de zile nu aveau autorizațiile necesare. IG nu a reușit să stabilească dacă sau cât de frecvent agenții au participat la evenimente publice, însă FBI nu a reușit să țină evidența unei astfel de activități.

Modificările finale și cele mai dramatice la Orientările AG au fost făcute în decembrie 2008, în ultima lună de funcționare a administrației Bush. Procurorul general de atunci, Michael Mukasey, a instituit noi linii directoare care autorizează FBI să efectueze investigații numite „evaluări” fără a necesita niciun predicat de fapt care să sugereze că ținta anchetei este implicată în activități ilegale sau amenințări la adresa securității naționale. Liniile directoare Mukasey permit FBI-ului să utilizeze o serie de tehnici de investigație intruzive în timpul acestor evaluări, inclusiv supravegherea fizică, preluarea datelor din bazele de date comerciale, recrutarea și sarcinile informatorilor pentru a participa la întâlniri sub pretenții false și angajarea în interviuri de „pretext” în care agenții FBI denaturează identitățile lor pentru a obține informații. „Evaluările” pot fi efectuate chiar împotriva unei persoane, pur și simplu pentru a stabili dacă el sau ea ar fi un informator FBI adecvat. Nimic din noile Linii directoare AG nu îi protejează pe americani în întregime nevinovați de a fi investigați temeinic de FBI fără un motiv întemeiat. Noile linii directoare autorizează în mod explicit supravegherea și infiltrarea grupurilor de advocacy pașnice înainte de demonstrații și nu interzic în mod clar utilizarea rasei, religiei sau originii naționale ca factori în inițierea evaluărilor.

Utilizarea rasei și a etniei. Un ghid intern al FBI pentru implementarea noilor Linii directoare AG, numit Ghidul de investigații și operațiuni interne (DIOG), conține dezvăluiri uimitoare despre modul în care FBI folosește rasa și etnia în efectuarea evaluărilor și investigațiilor. În primul rând, DIOG spune că activitățile de investigație și de colectare a informațiilor nu trebuie să se bazeze „numai pe rasă”. Dar Ghidul Departamentului de Justiție din 2003 privind utilizarea rasei în aplicarea legii federale, care este obligatoriu pentru FBI, spune că rasa nu poate fi folosită „în niciun fel” în absența unei descrieri specifice a subiectului. Există o diferență uriașă între utilizarea cursei ca A factor și folosind rasa ca unic factor.

Mai mult, DIOG descrie apoi utilizările autorizate de rasă și etnie pentru agenții FBI, care includ:

Este greu de imaginat cum orice agenție de aplicare a legii din SUA ar considera colectarea și cartografierea demografiei comunității rasiale și etnice ca o utilizare adecvată a resurselor sale (sau, de altfel, în concordanță cu obligația sa de a respecta, dar și de a pune în aplicare legile drepturilor civile ale SUA). De fapt, în 2007, Departamentul de Poliție din Los Angeles a abandonat un plan similar pentru cartografierea comunității musulmane din Los Angeles, în fața indignării publice. FBI a contestat aprins un raport din 2007 al lui Jeff Stein al Congresului Trimestrial, potrivit căruia FBI a urmărit vânzările de falafel din San Francisco pentru a încerca să găsească teroriști iranieni, dar DIOG confirmă cu siguranță că FBI consideră că comportamentul etnic și întreprinderile orientate spre etnie sunt obiective echitabile pentru supraveghere (și Stein a stat lângă povestea sa).

Exploatarea datelor. FBI strânge cantități incredibile de informații despre americani nevinovați prin intermediul colectării de date necontrolate și a programelor de extragere a datelor. Conform documentelor obținute de revista Wired în 2009, o ramură a FBI numită Centrul de analiză a filialei de securitate națională (NSAC) a colectat 1,5 miliarde de înregistrări din surse publice și private într-o operațiune masivă de extragere a datelor. Înregistrările colectate de FBI includ înregistrări financiare din baze de date corporative, cum ar fi tranzacții de hoteluri și companii de închirieri auto milioane de „rapoarte de activitate suspectă” de la instituții financiare milioane de înregistrări de la agregatori de date comerciale o multitudine de baze de date guvernamentale de aplicare a legii și non-legea și informații publice culese din agende telefonice și articole de știri. Înregistrările NSAC includ date din depozitul de date de investigație al FBI, care a fost identificat într-un raport al inspectorului general al Departamentului Justiției ca depozitar pentru informațiile colectate de FBI prin scrisori de securitate națională (NSL) și scrisori exigente ilegale.


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FBI și Partidul Comunist

& # 8220 Observatorii au știut în anii 1950 ceea ce au învățat încă din anii 1970, când Legea privind libertatea informației a deschis dosarul Biroului și # 8217s, și # 8216McCarthyism și # 8217 s-ar numi probabil „8216Hooverism”. ”& # 8221 Profesorul de istorie Ellen Schrecker

În timpul îndelungatului mandat de J. Edgar Hoover în calitate de director, FBI a reușit să spioneze organizații ostile intereselor Statelor Unite, inclusiv Ku Klux Klan și partidele naziste și comuniste. Hoover este demonizat în cărțile de istorie obișnuite, deoarece activiștii de stânga, care scriu majoritatea manualelor, se resimt de eforturile sale împotriva uneia dintre aceste trei organizații.

Din anumite motive necunoscute, profesorii colegiului și alți extremiști de stânga tind să fie anti-anti-comuniști, implacabil ostili oricui a luptat vreodată împotriva comunismului în orice calitate. Astfel, J. Edgar Hoover ar primi un tratament mult mai simpatic în cărțile de istorie dacă și-ar fi limitat eforturile antisubversive la KKK și naziști.

Contraspionajul în al doilea război mondial

FBI are o lungă istorie de rupere a societăților secrete ostile intereselor americane. Înainte ca SUA să fie chiar în război cu Germania nazistă, de exemplu, FBI descoperise și se infiltrase în inelul de spionaj Frederick Duquesne și chiar avea o aluniță FBI care opera postul de radio cu unde scurte prin care spionii naziști comunicau cu șefii lor din Berlin!

Când președintele Franklin Roosevelt a emis infamul său ordin executiv 9066, forțând cetățenii americani de origine japoneză în lagăre de internare, mișcarea a fost susținută de icoane liberale precum Earl Warren și Hugo Black și opusă lui J. Edgar Hoover.

Hoover i-a spus președintelui că marea majoritate a japonezilor americani erau americani loiali și că, dacă ar fi fost neloiali, ar fi știut despre asta. Ordinul de internare a fost inutil, a spus el, deoarece agenții săi au identificat acei japonezi-americani și germano-americani care reprezentau o amenințare pentru SUA cu mult înainte de începerea războiului și i-au arestat practic pe toți în termen de 48 de ore de la atacul din Pearl Harbor.

Când spionajul este un lucru rău

Nu vă așteptați ca profesorii de istorie înclinați spre stânga să-i acorde lui Hoover vreun credit pentru opunerea internării japoneze. „Crimele” sale, în ochii profesorului universitar tipic cu coadă de cal, sunt prea mari pentru a permite orice atenuare.

Profesorul Eric Foner, de exemplu, se plânge în manualul său de istorie de la începutul anului că Washington DC în anii 1950 și 8217 a fost un oraș afectat de spionaj, suspiciune și defăimare prin zvonuri Nu este spionajul sovietic larg răspândit din acea epocă de care se plânge. În anii 1950, agenții și informatorii FBI spionau Partidul Comunist, în timp ce membrii Partidului Comunist spionau guvernul SUA. Aripi de stânga, precum dr. Foner, se supără amarnic FBI-ului pentru că spionează spionii.

Profesorul Ellen Schrecker a descris FBI-ul lui Hoover ca fiind # 8220 cea mai importantă componentă a cruciadei anticomuniste, și # 8221 2 și nu înseamnă asta ca un compliment. La fel ca majoritatea profesorilor de istorie, ea îl condamnă pe Joseph McCarthy pentru că a efectuat o „vânătoare de vrăjitoare”, presupus fără nicio dovadă a spionajului comunist și apoi îl condamnă pe Hoover pentru că i-a furnizat lui McCarthy exact dovezile pe care le susține că McCarthy nu le-a avut niciodată.

Și Hoover a oferit o mulțime de dovezi.

FBI și CPUSA

FBI a obținut informații despre activitățile anti-americane ale Partidului Comunist SUA (CPUSA) din multe surse. Agenții FBI au avut acces la decriptarea proiectelor Venona de la mesajele dintre guvernul sovietic și rețeaua sa de spioni din SUA. Au lucrat îndeaproape cu părăsitori din CPUSA, inclusiv cu foștii maeștri Elizabeth Bentley și Whittaker Chambers. Cel mai impresionant, agenții și colaboratorii FBI au reușit să se infiltreze în partid și să-i monitorizeze activitățile din interior.

Tacticile care au permis FBI-ului să se infiltreze și să monitorizeze inelele de spionaj naziste în timpul celui de-al doilea război mondial au funcționat la fel de bine împotriva Partidului Comunist. În 1942, de exemplu, FBI a recrutat o cosmeticiană pe nume Mary Markward pentru a se infiltra în filiala CPUSA din Washington DC. Markward quickly rose through the ranks to become the Party’s treasurer, which gave her access to the party’s membership rolls and other records.

For several years every dues check and Lucrător zilnic subscription in the DC area went through Mrs. Markward’s hands, including several from Government employees, who were forbidden by federal law to be Communist Party members. She spent seven years as a mole in the Party before health problems forced her to retire. Two years later she testified before the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

And it wasn’t just the local Party offices that were infiltrated Hoover had spies inside the national party headquarters as well. Morris Childs, the most noteworthy example, was a charter member of CPUSA who grew disillusioned with the party as he learned of Stalin’s various atrocities. In 1947 Childs suffered a debilitating heart attack, and the cold response of his Party comrades made him ripe for recruitment as an FBI agent.

In the mid-1950’s Childs’ health improved, and he resumed his activities in the Communist Party, while secretly reporting to the FBI. By the early 1960’s Childs was the number two man in CPUSA, reporting directly to Party Chairman Gus Hall. He traveled frequently to Moscow before and during the Vietnam War to meet with high ranking Soviet officials including General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. 3 During his tenure he and his brother Jack smuggled thirty million dollars in Soviet money into the United States for the CPUSA. J. Edgar Hoover, of course, received reports detailing every dollar of it.

Hoover also got reports on Soviet support for the Communist forces fighting Americans in Vietnam, on the communications between Brezhnev’s government and Communist-controlled “Peace” groups in the US, and on every other Cold War era subject of any interest to the American side.

What the Files Reveal

Hoover’s agents kept detailed files on Communist agents operating in this country. Many of these files have now been released to the public in response to Freedom of Information Act requests, and some of them contain information painfully embarrassing to college history professors and other leftwing activists.

Frank Marshal Davis, for example, was a political activist who served as a political mentor for current US President Barack Obama. Davis’ relationship with the young future President has been confirmed both by right wing critics of the President, and by left wing supporters like Gerald Horne and Professor John Edgar Tidwell as well as by the Associated Press. 4 Many leftists portray Davis’ connection to the Communist Party as mere rumor-mongering by right wing zealots, but the undeniable truth is right there in Davis’ FBI file. Frank Marshal Davis was a Communist. He carried Communist Party membership card #47544. His wife Helen’s membership card was #62109.

Like my website? Read my book!

A Self-Made Nation tells the story of 18th and 19th century entrepreneurs who started out with nothing and created success for themselves while building a great nation.

Professor Howard Zinn, to cite one more example, wrote the million-selling history textbook A People’s History of the United States, which is, unfortunately, required reading for students in high schools and universities around the nation. Professor Foner has praised Zinn’s cartoonish book as a masterpiece written “with an enthusiasm rarely encountered in the leaden prose of academic history,” and said more specifically that Zinn’s thirty-four pages of slander against the Vietnam era US military “should be required reading for a new generation of students.” 5 Professor Zinn was a Communist Party member for most of his life, as his FBI file clearly shows.

It’s no wonder that anti-anti-Communists in this country have always hated J. Edgar Hoover. His agents and their tactics were a Communist’s worst nightmare.

1 Eric Foner, Give Me Liberty (Volume II, 2006 edition), p. 801
2 Ellen Schrecker. 1998. Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America. Boston: Little, Brown p. 239
3 Paul Kengor, Dupes, ISI Books 2010, pp. 282, 283
4 Ibid., pp. 446-452
5 Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States, Harper Perennial Modern Classics 2003, back cover


FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 

Since 1935, the FBI has provided information on current law enforcement issues and research in the field to the larger policing community through the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. Just as the FBI has adapted over the years to address the changing needs of the criminal justice community, the Bulletin continues changing to reach a more mobile and widespread audience. The current issue of the Bulletin will be the final hard-copy edition, ending nearly 80 years in that format.

The Bulletin will continue to deliver peer-reviewed articles submitted by a wide range of authorities, including subject matter experts, national security liaisons, officers and agents in the field, and legal instruction advisors. Beginning January 2013, these articles will be available exclusively online at http://www.fbi.gov. A brief history of the Bulletin explains its effort to help law enforcement professionals better understand and combat security threats facing the United States and protect and defend citizens.

In October 1932, the Bureau of Investigation began publishing a monthly magazine of fugitive write-ups titled Fugitives Wanted by Police. In October 1935, after the Bureau of Investigation became the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the publication was renamed the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin and added brief articles noting advances in police science to its fugitive write-ups. As the 1930s continued to witness a renaissance of American policing marked by increased professionalism and growth of the forensic sciences, the Bulletin served as a primary resource for disseminating information throughout the law enforcement community. 

Forties and Fifties

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States joined the Allied war effort against the Axis Powers. Like all segments of society, policing changed dramatically during the war years. Throughout the war era, the Bulletin provided law enforcement officials with information related to national defense, scientific aids, and police training. As the American economy expanded during the postwar years, unparalleled growth led to profound changes for the law enforcement community. In its pages the Bulletin addressed the major issues of the time, including rising levels of juvenile delinquency and policing’s role in maintaining national security.

Sixties and Seventies

In the 1960s, the Bulletin chronicled a decade of intense social change. In addition to advances in the forensic sciences, articles focused on such topics as the growing drug culture and police response to civil disturbances.

During the 1970s, the Bulletin featured articles that promoted the evolving emphasis on education in policing, as well as changes in tactics and hiring practices embraced by the nation’s law enforcement agencies.

Eighties and Nineties

During the 1980s, the Bulletin further established itself as a primary training resource for law enforcement administrators in agencies throughout the nation and the world. During the decade, the Bulletin featured articles on a broad array of scientific, technological, and strategic advances that would prove to have a dramatic affect on law enforcement. In the 1990s, the Bulletin embraced new technologies to reach a wider and more diverse readership. In 1991 it became one of the first law enforcement-related publications to go online and provide electronic versions of the magazine for viewing on the Internet. 

Today and the Future

Today the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin remains one of the most widely read law enforcement-related publications in the world. Each month law enforcement administrators in more than 105 countries receive copies. Given the high “pass-around” rate of the printed copies, as well as its online presence, the Bulletin has an estimated readership of over 200,000 criminal justice professionals each month.

The Bulletin has become an extension of the work of the FBI Training Division. While the FBI hosts over 3,000 law enforcement specialists each year at the Training Academy at Quantico, many others within the criminal justice system have benefited from the information shared by subject matter experts from all aspects of the law enforcement community who have provided information and instruction in the pages of the Bulletin.

Its mission remains strong—to inform, educate, and broaden the criminal justice community’s understanding of current issues facing law enforcement. For 80 years the Bulletin has served this community and will continue to do so in the challenging days ahead through its website, https://leb.fbi.gov/.

FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin Cover Montage

The cover montage on the following pages primarily highlights covers from the last 30 years. The Fugitives Wanted by Police covers from 1932 to September 1935 featured only text. The magazine changed its name to the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin in October 1935 and began including pictures of a fugitive on the cover until June 1938. From July 1938 until June 1965, the cover featured only logos. The first photographic covers began with the July 1965 issue, which featured a picture of former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. Those covers were either duotone or black and white until the first full-color cover appeared on the January 1989 issue. There are plans to eventually scan and reprint the contents on the magazine’s website of every issue of the magazine, including covers, going back to October 1932. Updates on the progress of this project will be posted on the site.


Organization, Mission and Functions Manual: Federal Bureau of Investigation

In 1908 Attorney General Charles Joseph Bonaparte issued an Order creating an investigative agency within the Department of Justice. The Order was confirmed in 1909 by Attorney General George W. Wickersham, who ordered the establishment of the Bureau of Investigation. The present name, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), was designated by Congress in 1935.

The mission of the FBI is to protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, to uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide leadership and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and partners and to perform these responsibilities in a manner that is responsive to the needs of the public and is faithful to the Constitution of the United States.


Ahmed Ferhani

Ahmed Ferhani, who was bipolar with a low IQ, was arrested for planning an attack on a synagogue in Manhattan in 2011 along with his friend Mohamed Mamdouh.

The NYPD ran the sting in this case and had been aware of Ferhani for years because his mother had to call the police when he had manic episodes as a teenager.

This is one of several instances where local police departments colluded with federal investigators. In Ferhani&rsquos case, federal authorities declined to pursue the case.

His lawyers argued that Ferhani was entrapped to justify the NYPD&rsquos surveillance of Muslims.

Prison officers pushed client to suicide, lawyer of mentally-ill Muslim inmate tells RThttps://t.co/OyjVYpcIyqpic.twitter.com/pu1PPTGAL7

&mdash RT America (@RT_America) April 14, 2016

Ferhani was introduced in 2010 to Ilter Ayturk, who was an undercover cop. It was Ayturk who gave the two the idea to carry out an attack and encouraged Ferhani to make anti-Semitic remarks. He told Ferhani about Palestine and blamed Jewish people, encouraging Ferhani to do the same.

Ferhani met another agent pretending to be a weapons dealer, giving him $100 for ammunition, a grenade, and three semi-automatic pistols.

Ferhani was sentenced to 10 years in prison, where he attempted suicide after being abused by guards.

The abuse was so bad that he had to have 12 staples in his head following one incident and was left in a coma after his suicide attempt, AP reports.


Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began monitoring Martin Luther King, Jr., in December 1955, during his involvement with the Montgomery bus boycott, and engaged in covert operations against him throughout the 1960s. FBI director J. Edgar Hoover was personally hostile toward King, believing that the civil rights leader was influenced by Communists. This animosity increased after April 1964, when King called the FBI “completely ineffectual in resolving the continued mayhem and brutality inflicted upon the Negro in the deep South” (King, 23 April 1964). Under the FBI’s domestic counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO) King was subjected to various kinds of FBI surveillance that produced alleged evidence of extramarital affairs, though no evidence of Communist influence.

The FBI was created in 1909 as the Justice Department’s unit to investigate federal crimes. Hoover became FBI director in 1924 and served until his death in 1972. Throughout the 1930s the FBI’s role expanded when President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked the FBI to research “subversives” in the United States, and Congress passed a series of laws increasing the types of federal crimes falling under the FBI’s jurisdiction. During World War II, the FBI was further authorized to investigate threats to national security. This loosely defined mission formed the heading under which the FBI began to investigate the civil rights movement.

The FBI initially monitored King under its Racial Matters Program, which focused on individuals and organizations involved in racial politics. Although the FBI raised concerns as early as March 1956, that King was associating with card-carrying members of the Communist Party, King’s alleged ties with communism did not become the focus of FBI investigations under the existing Communist Infiltration Program, designed to investigate groups and individuals subject to Communist infiltration, until 1962. In February 1962, Hoover told Attorney General Robert Kennedy that Stanley Levison, one of King’s closest advisors, was “a secret member of the Communist Party” (Hoover, 14 February 1962). In the following months, Hoover deployed agents to find subversive material on King, and Robert Kennedy authorized wiretaps on King’s home and Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) offices in October 1963.

Hoover responded to King’s criticisms of the Bureau’s performance in civil rights cases by announcing at a press conference in November 1964, that King was the “most notorious liar in the country” (Herbers, “Dr. King Rebuts Hoover”). Surprised by the accusation, King replied that he could only have sympathy for Hoover as he must be “under extreme pressure” to make such a statement (Herbers, “Dr. King Rebuts Hoover”). King asked an intermediary to set up a meeting between himself and Hoover to understand what had led to the comment. Andrew Young, a King aide who was present at the meeting, recalled that there was “not even an attitude of hostility” between the two, but at about this same time, the FBI anonymously sent King a compromising tape recording of him carousing in a Washington, D.C., hotel room, along with an anonymous letter that SCLC staff interpreted as encouraging King to commit suicide to avoid public embarrassment (Senate Select Committee, 167).

Hoover continued to approve investigations of King and covert operations to discredit King’s standing among financial supporters, church leaders, government officials, and the media. When King condemned the razboiul din Vietnam in a speech at Riverside Church on 4 April 1967, the FBI “interpreted this position as proof he ‘has been influenced by Communist advisers’” and stepped up their covert operations against him (Senate Select Committee, 180). The FBI considered initiating another formal COINTELPRO against King and fellow anti-war activist Dr. Benjamin Spock in 1967, when the two were rumored to be contemplating a run for the presidency, but ruled it out on the grounds that such a program would be more effective after the pair had officially announced their candidacy.

In August 1967, the FBI created a COINTELPRO against “Black Nationalist–Hate Groups,” which targeted SCLC, King, and other civil rights leaders. King was identified as a target because the FBI believed that he could become a “messiah” who could unify black nationalists “should he abandon his supposed ‘obedience’ to ‘white liberal doctrines’ (nonviolence) and embrace black nationalism” (Senate Select Committee, 180). In the last few months of King’s life, the FBI intensified its efforts to discredit him and to “neutralize” SCLC (Senate Select Committee, 180).

According to a U.S. Senate Committee convened in the 1970s to investigate the FBI’s domestic intelligence operations, the impact of the FBI’s efforts to discredit SCLC and King on the civil rights movement “is unquestionable” (Senate Select Committee, 183). The committee determined that: “Rather than trying to discredit the alleged Communists it believed were attempting to influence Dr. King, the Bureau adopted the curious tactic of trying to discredit the supposed target of Communist Party interest—Dr. King himself” (Senate Select Committee, 85).

Though some civil rights activists were aware that they were under surveillance, they still had to rely upon the Bureau to investigate racial discrimination cases. After the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 the FBI’s jurisdiction in segregation and voting rights cases expanded significantly, and the FBI’s arrests in the Mississippi triple murder case during Freedom Summer demonstrated some measure of public commitment to civil rights investigations.

After King’s assassination in 1968, the FBI successfully launched a large scale investigation to find his killer.


The shootout [ edit | editează sursa]

Relative positions of FBI agents' and suspects' vehicles after felony car stop at 12201 Southwest 82nd Avenue, Pinecrest, Miami, Florida. Illustration is not to scale.

At 8:45 a.m on April 11, 1986, a team of FBI agents led by Special Agent Gordon McNeill assembled at a Home Depot to initiate a rolling stakeout searching for the black Monte Carlo (Collazo's stolen car). The agents did not know the identity of the suspects at the time. They were acting on a hunch that the pair would attempt a robbery that morning.

A total of fourteen FBI agents in eleven cars participated in the search. Eight of these FBI agents took part in the actual shootout and were paired as follows

  • Supervisory Special Agent Gordon McNeill alone in his car
  • Special Agent Richard Manauzzi alone in his car
  • Special Agent Benjamin Grogan, with
  • Special Agent Jerry Dove
  • Special Agent Edmundo Mireles, Jr., with
  • Special Agent John Hanlon
  • Special Agent Gilbert Orrantia, with
  • Special Agent Ronald Risner

Around 9:30 a.m., agents Grogan and Dove spotted the suspect vehicle, and began to follow. Two other stakeout team cars joined them, and eventually an attempt was made to conduct a felony traffic stop of the suspects, who were forced off the road following collisions with the FBI cars of agents Grogan/Dove, agents Hanlon/Mireles and agent Manauzzi. This sent the suspect car nose first into a tree in a small parking area in front of a house at 12201 Southwest 82nd Avenue, pinned against a parked car on its passenger side and Manauzzi's car on the driver side.

Of the eight agents at the scene, two had Ithaca Model 37 shotguns in their vehicles (McNeill and Mireles), three were armed with semi-automatic Smith & Wesson Model 459 9mm pistols (Dove, Grogan, and Risner), and the rest were armed with Smith & Wesson revolvers. Two of the agents had backup handguns (Hanlon and Risner) and both would end up using them.

The initial collision that forced the suspects off the road caused some unforeseen problems for the agents, as the FBI vehicles sustained damage from the heavier, older car driven by Matix. Ε] Just prior to ramming the Monte Carlo, Manauzzi had pulled out his service revolver and placed it on the seat in anticipation of a shootout, Ε] but the force of the collision flung open his door and sent his weapon flying. Hanlon lost his .357 Magnum service revolver during the initial collision, though he was still able to fight with his Smith & Wesson Model 36 backup gun. The collision knocked off Grogan's eye glasses, and there is speculation his vision was so bad that he was unable to see clearly enough to be effective. (A claim disputed by the FBI's Medical Director, who stated that Grogan's vision was "not that bad".) Grogan, however, is credited with landing hits in the gunfight.

Manauzzi was wounded when Matix fired his shotgun and the pellets penetrated the door of Manauzzi's car. McNeill fired over the hood of Manauzzi's car but was wounded by return fire from Platt's Ruger Mini-14 rifle. Platt then fired his rifle at Mireles across the street. Mireles was hit in the left forearm, creating a severe wound. Ε] Platt then pulled back from the window, giving Matix opportunity to fire. Due to collision damage, Matix could only open his door partially, and fired one shotgun round at Grogan and Dove, striking their vehicle. Matix was then shot in the right forearm, probably by Grogan. Ζ] McNeill returned fire with six shots from his revolver, hitting Matix with two rounds in the head and neck. Matix was apparently knocked unconscious by the hits and fired no more rounds. Η] McNeill was then shot in the hand, and due to his wound and blood in his revolver's chambers, could not reload. & # 917 & # 93

As Platt climbed out of the passenger side car window, one of Dove's 9 mm rounds hit his right upper arm and went on to penetrate his chest, stopping an inch away from his heart. The autopsy found Platt’s right lung was collapsed and his chest cavity contained 1.3 liters of blood, suggesting damage to the main blood vessels of the right lung. Of his many gunshot wounds, this first was the primary injury responsible for Platt’s eventual death. ⎖] The car had come to a stop against a parked vehicle, and Platt had to climb across the hood of this vehicle, a Cutlass. As he did so, he was shot a second and third time, in the right thigh and left foot. The shots were believed to have been fired by Dove. & # 9111 & # 93

Platt took up position by the passenger side front fender of the Cutlass. He fired a .357 Magnum revolver at agents Ronald Risner and Gilbert Orrantia, and was shot a fourth time when turning to fire at Hanlon, Dove and Grogan. The bullet, fired by Risner or Orrantia, penetrated Platt's right forearm, fractured the radius bone and exited the forearm. This wound caused Platt to drop his revolver. ⎘] It is estimated that Platt was shot a fifth time shortly afterwards, this time by Risner. The bullet penetrated Platt's right upper arm, exited below the armpit and entered his torso, stopping below his shoulder blade. The wound was not serious. & # 9113 & # 93

Platt fired one round from his Mini-14 at Risner and Orrantia's position, wounding Orrantia with shrapnel created by the bullet's passage, and two rounds at McNeill. One round hit McNeill in the neck, causing him to collapse and leaving him paralyzed for several hours. Platt then apparently positioned the Mini-14 against his shoulder using his uninjured left hand. & # 9114 & # 93

Dove's 9 mm pistol was rendered inoperative after being hit by one of Platt's bullets. Hanlon fired at Platt and was shot in the hand while reloading. Grogan and Dove were kneeling alongside the driver’s side of their car. Both were preoccupied with getting Dove's gun running and did not detect that Platt was aggressively advancing upon them. When Platt rounded the rear of their car he killed Grogan with a shot to the chest, shot Hanlon in the groin area and then killed Dove with two shots to the head. Platt then entered the Grogan/Dove car in an apparent attempt to flee the scene. ⎛] As Platt entered Grogan and Dove's car, Mireles, able to use only one arm, fired the first of five rounds from his pump-action shotgun, wounding Platt in both feet. Ε] At an unknown time, Matix had regained consciousness and he joined Platt in the car, entering via the passenger door. Mireles fired four more rounds at Platt and Matix, but hit neither. & # 9116 & # 93

Around this time, Metro-Dade Police Officers Leonard Figueroa and Martin Heckman arrived. Heckman covered McNeill's paralyzed body with his own. & # 9117 & # 93

Platt's actions at this moment in the fight have been debated. A civilian witness described Platt leaving the car, walking almost 20 feet and firing at Mireles three times at close range. Mireles does not remember this happening. Officer Heckman does not remember Platt leaving the Grogan/Dove car. Risner and Orrantia, observing from the other side of the street, stated that they did not see Platt leave the car and fire at Mireles. ⎞] However, it is known for certain that Platt pulled Matix's Dan Wesson revolver at some point and fired three rounds. ⎚] ⎟]

Platt attempted to start the Grogan/Dove car. Mireles drew his .357 Magnum revolver, moved parallel to the street and then directly toward Platt and Matix. Mireles fired six rounds at the suspects. The first round missed, hitting the back of the front seat. The second hit the driver's side window post and fragmented, with one small piece hitting Platt in the scalp. The third hit Matix in the face, and fragmented in two, with neither piece causing a serious wound. The fourth hit Matix in the face next to his right eye socket, travelled downward through the facial bones, into the neck, where it entered the spinal column and severed the spinal cord. The fifth hit Matix in the face, penetrated the jaw bone and neck and came to rest by the spinal column. ⎠] Mireles reached the driver's side door, extended his revolver through the window, and fired his sixth shot at Platt. The bullet penetrated Platt's chest and bruised the spinal cord, ending the gunfight. ⎡]

The shootout involved ten people: two suspects and eight FBI agents. Of the ten, only one, Special Agent Manauzzi, did not fire any shots (firearm thrown from car in initial collision), while only one, Special Agent Risner, was able to emerge from the battle without a wound. The incident lasted under five minutes yet approximately 145 shots were exchanged. Ε] ⎢]

Toxicology tests showed that the abilities of Platt and Matix to fight through multiple traumatic gunshot wounds and continue to battle and attempt to escape were not achieved through any chemical means. Both of their bodies were drug-free at the time of their deaths. ⎣]


The History Of The FBI's Secret 'Enemies' List

J. Edgar Hoover was the first director of the FBI. He introduced fingerprinting and forensic techniques to the crime-fighting agency, and pushed for stronger federal laws to punish criminals who strayed across state lines. He also kept secret files on more than 20,000 Americans he deemed "subversive." Anonymous/Library of Congress ascunde legenda

J. Edgar Hoover was the first director of the FBI. He introduced fingerprinting and forensic techniques to the crime-fighting agency, and pushed for stronger federal laws to punish criminals who strayed across state lines. He also kept secret files on more than 20,000 Americans he deemed "subversive."

Anonymous/Library of Congress

Four years after Pulitzer Prize-winning writer Tim Weiner published Legacy of Ashes, his detailed history of the CIA, he received a call from a lawyer in Washington, D.C.

"He said, 'I've just gotten my hands on a Freedom of Information Act request that's 26 years old for [FBI Director] J. Edgar Hoover's intelligence files. Would you like them?' " Weiner tells Aer proaspate Terry Gross. "And after a stunned silence, I said, 'Yes, yes.' "

Weiner went to the lawyer's office and collected four boxes containing Hoover's personal files on intelligence operations between 1945 and 1972.

"Reading them is like looking over [Hoover's] shoulder and listening to him talk out loud about the threats America faced, how the FBI was going to confront them," he says. "Hoover had a terrible premonition after World War II that America was going to be attacked — that New York or Washington was going to be attacked by suicidal, kamikaze airplanes, by dirty bombs . and he never lost this fear."

Weiner's new book, Enemies: A History of the FBI, traces the history of the FBI's secret intelligence operations, from the bureau's creation in the early 20 th century through its ongoing fight in the current war on terrorism. He explains how Hoover's increasing concerns about communist threats against the United States led to the FBI's secret intelligence operations against anyone deemed "subversive."

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Secrecy And The Red Raids

Weiner details how Hoover became increasingly worried about communist threats against the United States. Even before he became director of the FBI, Hoover was conducting secret intelligence operations against U.S. citizens he suspected were anarchists, radical leftists or communists. After a series of anarchist bombings went off across the United States in 1919, Hoover sent five agents to infiltrate the newly formed Communist Party.

"From that day forward, he planned a nationwide dragnet of mass arrests to round up subversives, round up communists, round up Russian aliens — as if he were quarantining carriers of typhoid," Weiner says.

On Jan. 1, 1920, Hoover sent out the arrest orders, and at least 6,000 people were arrested and detained throughout the country.

"When the dust cleared, maybe 1 in 10 was found guilty of a deportable offense," says Weiner. "Hoover denied — at the time and until his death — that he had been the intellectual author of the Red Raids."

Hoover, Attorney General Mitchell Palmer and Secretary of the Navy Franklin Delano Roosevelt all came under attack for their role in the raids.

"It left a lifelong imprint on Hoover," says Weiner. "If he was going to attack the enemies of the United States, better that it be done in secret and not under law. Because to convict people in court, you have to [reveal] your evidence, [but] when you're doing secret intelligence operations, you just have to sabotage and subvert them and steal their secrets — you don't have to produce evidence capable of discovery by the other side. That could embarrass you or get the case thrown out — because you had gone outside the law to enforce the law."

Hoover started amassing secret intelligence on "enemies of the United States" — a list that included terrorists, communists, spies — or anyone Hoover or the FBI had deemed subversive.

Hoover saw Martin Luther King Jr. as an "enemy of the state," says author Tim Weiner. Express Newspapers/Getty Images ascunde legenda

Hoover saw Martin Luther King Jr. as an "enemy of the state," says author Tim Weiner.

Express Newspapers/Getty Images

The Civil Rights Movement

Later on, anti-war protesters and civil rights leaders were added to Hoover's list.

"Hoover saw the civil rights movement from the 1950s onward and the anti-war movement from the 1960s onward, as presenting the greatest threats to the stability of the American government since the Civil War," he says. "These people were enemies of the state, and in particular Martin Luther King [Jr.] was an enemy of the state. And Hoover aimed to watch over them. If they twitched in the wrong direction, the hammer would come down."

Hoover was intent on planting bugs around civil rights leaders — including King — because he thought communists had infiltrated the civil rights movement, says Weiner. Hoover had his intelligence chief bug King's bedroom, and then sent the civil rights leader a copy of the sex recordings his intelligence chief had taken of King — along with an anonymous letter from the FBI.

"It was a poison pen letter, it was a hate letter it wasn't from anyone in particular, but Martin Luther King and his wife would certainly know the source of the tapes, that it had to be the FBI," says Weiner. "And the poison pen letter read: 'King, look into your heart. The American people would know you for what you are — an evil, abnormal beast. There is only one way out for you. You better take it before your filthy, abnormal fraudulent self is bared to the nation.' "

Weiner says King ignored the letter, even as the FBI tried diligently to defame him.

"They were trying to get King knocked off from his perch as the Nobel Peace Prize recipient," he says. "They sent [the tapes] to colleges to keep him off campus, they sent it around Washington."

It was Hoover, says Weiner, who decided that bugging King's bedroom was necessary.

"When it came down to bugging bedrooms, you had to be careful not to get caught, but there wasn't anything to stop him," says Weiner. "He decided up to a point . where the boundaries of the law [were] when it came to black bag jobs, break-ins, bugging, surveillance, the constitutionality of gathering secret intelligence on America's enemies — both real and imagined."

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Repere ale interviului

On J. Edgar Hoover's legacy

"Hoover is the inventor of the modern American national security state. Every fingerprint file, every DNA record, every iris recorded through biometrics, every government dossier on every citizen and alien in this country owes its life to him. We live in his shadow, though he's been gone for 40 years. As they always told the agents at the FBI academy when they were training, 'An institution is the length and shadow of a man.' "

On Robert Kennedy authorizing Hoover's plan to bug Martin Luther King Jr.

"Hoover had come to Bobby Kennedy and President Kennedy and said, 'Look, Stanley Levinson — King's adviser — is a communist. He's a secret communist, he's an underground communist, and he's using Martin Luther King as a cat's paw.' Well, when you put it that way, you weren't gainsaying Hoover if you were John or Bobby Kennedy. So they said yes."

On why Hoover asked Roosevelt for "unlimited powers"

"Hoover did not want any limits. He wanted no charter, no rules. He wanted the FBI to investigate the so-and-so's. And he believed that the Soviet Union was trying to steal America's atomic secrets, to burrow into the State Department, the Pentagon, the FBI and the White House — and he was right."

On Hoover's list of gays in government

"Hoover's war on gays in the government dates back to 1937 and lasted all his life. He conflated — and he was not alone — communism with homosexuality. Both communists and homosexuals had secret coded language that they spoke to each other, and they had clandestine lives, they met in clandestine places, they had secrets. And in certain cases, such as the British spy ring that penetrated the Pentagon in the 1940s and early 1950s, they were both communists and homosexuals. Hoover didn't see a dime's worth of difference there. They were one and the same. This was hammered into him when the FBI dealt with one of the most famous informants — Whittaker Chambers — who helped bring down secret Soviet espionage rings in this country. He was a well-known writer at Timp revistă. Chambers was a secret homosexual and a secret communist. Hoover saw a nexus there, and he never let that thought go."

On Hoover's relationship with President Nixon

"It was deep. It was based on mutual respect and dependency. And then it broke down during the last year and a half of Hoover's life — around the time that Nixon turns on the White House tapes and starts bugging himself. Nixon wants his enemies destroyed — all of them. Hoover is no longer willing to do his dirty work for him — his black bag jobs, his breaking and entering, his bugging. Nixon becomes increasingly frustrated with this and he sets up his own bucket shop — the plumbers. Six weeks after Hoover dies, they get caught breaking into the Watergate."